Secure Sharing of Tuple Spaces in Ad Hoc Settings  by Handorean, Radu & Roman, Gruia-Catalin
p ( )
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume85.html 20 pages
Secure Sharing of Tuple Spaces
in Ad Hoc Settings
Radu Handorean 1 Gruia-Catalin Roman 2
Mobile Computing Laboratory
Computer Science and Engineering Department
Washington University
Saint Louis, Missouri, 63130-4889, USA
http://mobilab.cse.wustl.edu
Abstract
Security is emerging as a growing concern throughout the distributed computing
community. Typical solutions entail specialized infrastructure support for authen-
tication, encryption and access control. Mobile applications executing over ad hoc
wireless networks present designers with a rather distinct set of security require-
ments. A totally open setting and limited resources call for lightweight and highly
decentralized security solutions. In this paper we propose an approach that relies
on extending an existing coordination middleware for mobility (Lime). The need to
continue to oﬀer a very simple model of coordination that assures rapid software
development led to limiting extensions solely to password protected tuple spaces
and per tuple access control. Password distribution and security are relegated to
the application realm. Host level security is ensured by the middleware design and
relies on standard support provided by the Java system. Secure interactions among
agents across hosts are accomplished by careful exploitation of the interceptor pat-
tern and the use of standard encryption. The paper explains the design strategy
used to add security support in Lime and its implications for the development of
mobile applications over ad hoc networks.
1 Introduction
Ad hoc networks are formed when hosts equipped with wireless communica-
tion capabilities interact with each other directly without support from any
ﬁxed wired infrastructure. Hosts can range greatly in both computational
power and communication capabilities. Standard computers may be placed
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on mobile platforms (e.g., cars) and may be given continuous access to a re-
liable power source. Laptops and palmtops may be carried by individuals or
small robots and subject to power limitations. Small processors may be em-
bedded in specialized devices or integrated within miniature sensor systems.
For the purpose of this paper, our interest is in applications that execute
on computing devices that are suﬃciently powerful to run Java software, are
highly mobile, and do not rely in any way on the wired infrastructure. A
world in which each individual carries a PDA but base stations are absent is
a good metaphor for our settings. Disaster response, mine exploration, low
proﬁle military action, are representative application domains for our work.
In all these cases network formation is opportunistic, its structure is subject
to evolution, disconnections are a way of life, and the size of the community
is constrained by the range of the wireless transmitters. Ad hoc routing, if
available, may signiﬁcantly expand the number of participating hosts.
Application development targeted to such dynamic settings is particularly
diﬃcult and coordination methods have been proposed as a possible software
engineering solution. The basic idea is that of oﬀering the developer a simple
application-programming interface (API) that facilitates spatial and temporal
decoupling among software components. In Linda [4], for instance, the API
consists of a small set of operations that oﬀer content-based access to tuples
stored in a persistent global tuple space. Computation is relegated to local
processing taking place in each component with the communication mechanics
being completely hidden behind a high-level coordination model. The result
is a signiﬁcant reduction in the application development eﬀort. Lime (Linda
In a Mobile Environment) [9] is a coordination model and associated middle-
ware that sought to extend this basic idea to mobility. In Lime, applications
are constructed out of components called agents that represent the basic unit
of modularity, execution and mobility. Agents reside on hosts and can move
among them as long as connectivity is available. Agents residing on hosts
within communication range form a group. Group membership changes as
communication links break down and get reestablished. Engagement and dis-
engagement are the terms used to refer to joining and leaving a given group.
An agent may create tuple spaces that can be shared with other agents within
the same group. Each tuple space has a name and identically named tuple
spaces belonging to agents in the same group are shared as if they were a single
global (federated) tuple space. As groups change membership the content of
each federated tuple space changes as well, with departing agents taking their
tuples along and arriving agents contributing new tuples.
Ease of coordination within an open environment is a great asset but it
must be tempered by security concerns. Many strategies commonly used in
wired networks become problematic in the ad hoc setting. There is no protec-
tion against eavesdropping, there are no trusted authentication servers, there
are no centralized databases of secure information, etc. Moreover, any pro-
posed solution must be sensitive to resource utilization. Lightweight solutions
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are preferred but they must be able to work in settings where one cannot an-
ticipate who will show up when and for how long. Full transparency may be
desirable but the ability to hide security concerns from the application devel-
oper and user may not always be feasible. In this paper, we pose the question
whether the coordination strategy made available in Lime can be made se-
cure with minimal impact on the Lime middleware and on its fundamental
coordination model.
Our solution was to extend the Lime API in two important ways. First,
we oﬀer password-protected access to tuple spaces. The sharing policy within
a group is extended to require not just the same name but protection with
the same password. Within a single group, identically named tuple spaces are
further partitioned according to their associated passwords. This is comple-
mented by the ability to password-protect individual tuples regardless whether
they are part of a protected or unprotected tuple space. Interestingly enough,
the implementation of these two capabilities employs distinct features of the
underlying Lime system. Moreover, by exploiting the fact that Lime restricts
tuple space access to its creator agent, password usage is limited solely to
tuple space creation, thus minimizing the scope of API modiﬁcations and also
aﬀording some level of robustness in regard to possible programming errors
involving incorrect password utilization. In the ﬁnal analysis, by making ef-
fective use of the existing Lime design the secure version of the system ends
up to be a sandwiching of the existing middleware between a security veneer
above and an interceptor below. The latter provides the proper encryption of
messages associated with secure tuple spaces using a protected table shared
with the former. The price we pay for achieving this level of simplicity is the
need to accomplish the initial password distribution possibly outside of the
application itself and the requirement for the application to manage required
password changes in response to possible security compromises.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the Lime coordination model. This is necessary since the design relies heavily
on both technical features of Lime and on extending its semantics to security.
Section 3 explains our security extensions to the original model. Section 4
presents the implementation strategy. Section 5 describes the test applica-
tion that evaluates the security extensions we implemented. Related work is
presented in Section 6. Conclusions appear in Section 7.
2 The Lime Coordination Model
Because this eﬀort builds directly on Lime and exploits some of its more subtle
technical features, we start our presentation with an overview the Lime model
and illustrate it by means of a simple example involving a group of people who
communicate with each other via a chat program running on PDAs equipped
with a wireless capability at the level of the 802.11b protocol.
The Lime middleware supports the development of applications exhibiting
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physical mobility of hosts and logical mobility of agents. An agent is a soft-
ware component that may reside permanently on a host or may move from
one host to another connected host. Hosts can move in physical space, serve
as containers for the agents, and run local versions of the Lime system server.
As suggested earlier, Lime extends the coordination model of Linda in sig-
niﬁcant ways. First, the globally accessed persistent tuple space of Linda is
replaced in Lime by transient sharing of identically named tuple spaces be-
longing to agents that reside on hosts that are mutually accessible over the ad
hoc network. Other Lime extensions to Linda include location speciﬁc opera-
tions, transparent tuple migration, and the ability to react to the presence or
appearance of tuples within transiently shared tuple spaces.
Transparent Context Maintenance. The model underlying Lime ac-
complishes the shift from a ﬁxed global context to a dynamically changing
one by distributing the single Linda tuple space across multiple tuple spaces,
each local to an agent, and by introducing rules for transient sharing of the
individual tuple spaces based on naming and connectivity; Lime allows an
agent to structure its holdings across multiple tuple spaces each being shared
only with other identically named tuple spaces local to other agents within
the group. Group membership is controlled by connectivity among hosts.
Sharing of multiple tuple spaces results in the formation of a virtual global
data structure called a federated tuple space. The content of the federated
tuple space is the union of the contents associated with the contributing tuple
spaces. Access to the federated tuple space is accomplished by simply using
the API for the local tuple space. After sharing, local actions have global
eﬀects. Simplicity is achieved by accessing solely local tuple spaces regard-
less of the network setting. Context awareness and coordination is achieved by
transparent maintenance of a broader computational context and by transpar-
ent extension of the eﬀects of what otherwise appear to be local actions. An
agent’s horizon is guaranteed to expand or contract atomically with connec-
tions (re)establishment or breakdown (the agent learns about context changes
atomically with respect to their occurrence).
The agent’s gateway to the federated tuple space is called the interface
tuple space (its). Basic access to the its takes place using the traditional Linda
primitives (e.g., in, rd, out), whose semantics remain essentially unaﬀected.
The out operation takes a tuple t and places it into a tuple space; in takes
as parameter a template p and blocks until a tuple matching the template is
written to the tuple space at which point in returns a copy of that tuple, after
removing the original from the tuple space; rd exhibits a similar behavior but
it leaves the original in the tuple space–the details of the matching mechanism
will be explained later. Lime oﬀers also non-blocking versions of in and rd in
the form of probe variants of the same operations (e.g., inp, rdp). In general,
non-blocking operations return a matching tuple (if one is available) and null
otherwise. Both blocking and non-blocking extensions designed to handle
entire groups of tuples matching the same template are also included in Lime.
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A simple implementation of the chat program can be readily accomplished
by having one agent per PDA with each agent initially creating a single shared
tuple space called “Chat Room.” A message-sending request is transformed
into placing in the tuple space a tuple containing the user id, the user name,
a sequence number, and the message text. All other agents in the group
gain access to the newly generated tuple by issuing a rd operation with an
appropriate template on their own local tuple space with the same name. The
originator of the message can remove it at some later point by employing a
removal policy based on time to live. An alternate approach might be to
implement a simple logical clock protocol through proper manipulation of the
sequence numbers.
As in Linda, a tuple consists of an ordered list of ﬁelds. Each ﬁeld has a
type and a value. A template is an ordered list of ﬁelds that can contain type
designators (formal ﬁelds) or explicit values (actual ﬁelds). A tuple and a
template are said to match if both contain the same number of ﬁelds and each
corresponding pair of ﬁelds matches. Lime was extended with the ability to
specify the matching policy on a ﬁeld by ﬁeld basis. The ﬁeld-level matching
policies available are: (1) Exact value match asks the template ﬁeld to provide
an actual that will match exactly the type and the value of the corresponding
ﬁeld in the tuple. (2) Exact type matching allows the ﬁeld in the template to
be a formal but requires its type to be the same as the type of the object in
the corresponding tuple ﬁeld. (3) Polymorphic type match allows the ﬁeld of a
template to be a formal and its type to be a super type for the corresponding
ﬁeld’s type in the tuple. That is a class will match any subclass derived from
it (directly or indirectly).
Controlling Context Awareness. A read-only tuple space called the
LimeSystemTupleSpace provides an agent with a view of the overall system
conﬁguration. Its tuples contain information about the mobile agents present
in the community, physical hosts they execute on, and tuple spaces created
for coordination. Standard tuple space operations on LimeSystemTupleSpace
allow an agent to respond to the arrival and departure of other agents and
hosts. If we make the simplifying assumption that all the agents in the group
are part of the chat room, an agent can easily build a list of who is around by
examining LimeSystemTupleSpace.
Furthermore, Lime provides ﬁne-grained control over the context on which
an agent chooses to operate by extending its operations with tuple location
parameters that deﬁne projections of the federated tuple space. Lime expresses
tuple location parameters in terms of agent identiﬁers and host identiﬁers.
These identiﬁers can be used to place tuples at a particular agent location or
to restrict queries to speciﬁc agents or hosts.
Reacting to Changes in Context. Mobility entails a highly dynamic
environment, where reacting to changes constitutes a major fraction of the
application design. Therefore, Lime extends the basic Linda tuple space with
the notion of reaction. A reaction R(s, p) is deﬁned by a code fragment s
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that speciﬁes the actions to be executed when a tuple matching the template
p is found in the tuple space. After each operation on the tuple space, Lime
non-deterministically selects a reaction and compares the template p against
the tuple space contents. If a matching tuple is found, s is executed, otherwise
the reaction is a skip. This selection and execution proceeds until there are
no reactions enabled, and normal processing resumes. Thus, reactions are
executed as if they belonged to a separate reactive program which runs to
ﬁxed point after each non-reactive statement. Blocking operations are not
allowed in s, as they could prevent the program from reaching ﬁxed point.
This idealized perspective of reactions semantics is tempered in Lime by the
pragmatics of an eﬀective implementation. As such, reactions in Lime come
in two forms: strong reactions and weak reactions. Strong reactions execute
atomically with the writing of the tuple that enables them. These reactions
are not allowed over the entire federated tuple space; they must always be
restricted to a host or agent. Maintaining the requirements of atomicity and
serialization imposed by strong reactive statements would require a distributed
transaction encompassing multiple hosts for every tuple space operation. Lime
also provides the notion of weak reaction. The processing of a weak reaction
proceeds similarly, except that the execution of s does not happen atomically
with the detection of a tuple matching p; instead, it is guaranteed to take
place eventually if connectivity is preserved.
Our earlier solution for the chat room can be simpliﬁed greatly through
the use of reactions. Each agent in the chat room can register a weak reaction
for tuples containing messages in the chat room. By doing so, when a tuple
is inserted in the tuple space all reactions ﬁre initiating eventual delivery of a
copy of the message to the respective agents. Only after all these reactions are
completed, local processing can resume on the PDA that sent the message. By
now, it is known that the message delivery has been initiated already and the
agent can remove it safely by issuing an in operation prior to continuing its
local processing. The resulting code assumes the following general structure.
LimeTupleSpace lts = new LimeTupleSpace(”Chat Room”);
lts.addWeakReaction(messageTemplate, reactor);
while(true){
// read message from keyboard
//place the tuple into the tuple space
lts.out(new Tuple(message from user));
// remove the message and discard the value returned
lts.in(message from user);}
Each user creates a tuple space named “Chat Room.” Then he adds a weak
reaction to this tuple space. The reaction’s template (messageTemplate) will
be compared against tuples in the tuple space and, if any match is found, the
reaction is ﬁred. The parameter “reactor” is a reference to an object that
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implements the callback method. This method will receive a copy of the tuple
and may send the message to the GUI.
3 Security Extensions
In this section we study a set of extensions required to accomplish a smooth
transition to a secure version of the model and its associated middleware.
Password Protected Tuple Spaces. Returning to the chat room appli-
cation, it is easy to see that anyone having a PDA, even if she/he is unaware of
the name given to the shared tuple space, can employ polymorphic matching
over LimeSystemTupleSpace to return all the information needed to create
a tuple space having the right name. To protect against such attacks we
associate a password with each secure tuple space:
SecureLimeTupleSpace slts = new SecureLimeTupleSpace(”name”, ”pwd”);
An agent will be considered authorized if it has knowledge of both the
tuple name and its password. An entry in LimeSystemTupleSpace corre-
sponding to this tuple space will still exist but will not be recognizable as the
password is used to generate the key that encrypts the actual name. Interest-
ingly enough this will not permit for an agent to simply read the name from
LimeSystemTupleSpace and create its own local tuple. As we will see in the
implementation section, the name of a tuple space suﬀers some transforma-
tions on the way from the user to LimeSystemTupleSpace. These changes
will prevent an intruder from creating an unprotected tuple space by copying
the encrypted name of a tuple space from LimeSystemTupleSpace and not by
generating it using the correct clear name and password.
Secure Communication. If a tuple space operation involves a remote
execution on some other host whose agent contributes to the federated tuple
space, the request will be sent across the wireless link and the results will
be sent back over insecure wired or wireless lines. Eavesdropping is made
easy by the fact that information travelling across the network consists of
clear serialized Java objects. Secure communication between hosts is achieved
by encrypting the messages associated with a given tuple space using the
password supplied when the tuple space was created ﬁrst (if any). The remote
party is supposed to have access to the same password since sharing of the
tuple space is taking place. For tuple spaces which are not protected, the
messages will not be encrypted and the other party will need to know only the
communication protocol in order to be able to deserialize the objects received
in the request.
Tuple level access control. Even if we can now protect an entire tuple
space, restrictions at the tuple level are still desirable in many applications.
The reasons are two fold. In case of a secure tuple space shared among co-
operating agents, tuple level protection can protect inadvertent tuple removal
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or access. Similarly, in an unprotected tuple space this feature aﬀords some
level of protection against malicious agents.
in(templ)
template
Local tuple space
template
blocked
ok
result
Agent2Agent1
RO
Local tuple space
tuple
in(templ, pwd)
Fig. 1. The execution of an in operation matching a Read-Only tuple. Agent1 is
able to retrieve the tuple because it provides the (correct) remove-password, while
Agent2 blocks because its template, even when it matches the data part of the tuple,
does not satisfy the security requirements.
A tuple may have a password to protect the tuple from removal (hereafter
called remove-password) and a diﬀerent password that protects the tuple from
reading (hereafter called read-password). If these passwords are diﬀerent and
both diﬀerent from null, a rd operation can read the tuple if it provides either
one of the passwords, assuming that the ﬁelds match. This is because an agent
that has the password to remove a tuple is also entitled to read the tuple. If
a tuple has a remove-password, an in operation will have to provide the same
remove-password to match this tuple. If the tuple has no remove-password but
has a read-password, an in operation will need to provide the latter password
to remove the tuple (Figure 1).
Group operations (e.g., rdg, ing, outg) as well as probe (i.e., nonblocking)
operations (e.g., rdp, inp) behave similarly. Figure 2 shows how a rdg opera-
tion returns only the tuples that satisfy the security constraints, even if more
tuples match the provided template.
As we will see in the implementation section, the passwords will be stored
as special ﬁelds of a tuple with the matching policy set to exact value matching.
For obvious reasons, no wildcards can be allowed in these ﬁelds’ matching. It
is also forbidden for an agent to push a protected tuple into some other’s agent
local tuple space. The new owner may not have the password to remove the
tuple and will be stuck with it indeﬁnitely.
In our chat application, if two agents want to exchange private information
they need a secret key to protect the tuple space. While the authentication
of the two is outside the scope of this example, we can show how they can
establish a session key for their communication. Either one can advertise its
public key in a public tuple space. While everybody should be able to read
this public key, the agent wouldn’t like for anybody to be able to remove it,
therefore will advertise it as read-only.
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protected tuples are not matched
will read all the tuples
a correct template and password
dg(template, rd_pwd)
rd pwd
tuple
rd pwd
tuple
tuple
tuple
rdg(template)
unprotected tuples are returned
Fig. 2. The execution of an rdg on a group of read-only and fully accessible tuples.
The advertisement of this public key can be done like this:
slts.out(publicKey, null, removePassword);
The publicKey parameter represents the tuple that contains the public key.
The null parameter represents the lack of the read-password, which means that
everybody is allowed to read it but the removePassword parameter indicates
that only an agent that has this password can remove the tuple, named here
“publicKey”. Once the public key advertisement is secure, the two agents can
agree on a private session key.
Discussion. Since full agent authentication requires a trusted computing
base to certify identities in ad hoc settings, agents accessing the tuple space
have to be authenticated on a diﬀerent basis. Knowledge of an externally
supplied password is one simple way of accomplishing this. Furthermore,
passwords are user friendly, i.e., it is easier to handle passwords than keys.
Password distribution is an important issue but also problematic in ad hoc
networks. We have to assume that the initial distribution is carried out ex-
ternal to the application. However, using the features provided by the model,
the stage is set for password exchange between diﬀerent agents. An agent
(say Agent1) can advertise its public key in a read-only tuple (i.e., a tu-
ple is protected with a remove-password, which is never given away, but no
read-password). Another agent (say Agent2) can read this tuple and obtain
Agent1’s public key. The only problem Agent2 has to solve is to make sure
that what it reads is indeed Agent1’s public key and not a public key that is
set up by a man-in-the-middle attack, which involves placing a fake key into
Agent1’s tuple space. This can be easily solved. All Agent2 has to do is to
attempt to remove the tuple. If the tuple is read-only it must be the correct
tuple. Agent2 reads the tuple from Agent1’s local tuple space and, since it is
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a protected tuple, it couldn’t have been planted there by another agent. Once
Agent2 has Agent1’s public key they can run a protocol to establish a secret
session key. This secret key can be used to share password-protected tuple
spaces or to exchange private information via password-protected tuples.
If a password is compromised, the only way to ﬁx the problem is to remove
the tuples protected by that password and rewrite them protected by a new
password. If the password was protecting a tuple space, all the tuples have to
be removed and rewritten in a new tuple space. Once a tuple space is created
or a tuple is written to a tuple space, the password(s) protecting them cannot
be changed anymore.
Any agent can notify the others if a password is compromised and should
be changed. Each agent can register a strong reaction with each other agent
it interacts with, looking for ’password compromised’ announcement tuples.
When an agent wants to warn the others, all it has to do is write the warning
tuple to the tuple space. Even if the attacker is now able to remove the
tuple, the strong reactions will have to ﬁre before the removal can complete.
Thus, all interested agents can be notiﬁed. To resume collaboration, they will
need to create another safe communication environment, i.e., to change the
compromised password. There are several diﬀerent ways this can be done.
One would be to have each agent interact with an elected leader of the group.
This leader could supervise the distribution of a new session key to all honest
agents. This is a centralized approach (even though the leader is elected on
the spot and not predeﬁned) and a rather costly process of redistribution of
a new session key (the leader will have to run a session key establishment
protocol based on public key encryption with each other agent). A completely
distributed approach would be to have each agent generate the new session key
according to an algorithm known by all trusted agents. Thus they all generate
the same new session key and are able to resume secure communication faster,
as long as the key generation algorithms is not compromised as well.
Backward compatibility with older versions of Lime is insured by preserving
the unprotected tuples and unprotected tuple spaces. The unprotected tuple
spaces don’t require encrypted communication and they ﬁt the communication
protocol of the tuple spaces from older versions of Lime.
4 Implementation
The security extensions introduced earlier were designed so as to have min-
imal impact over the programming interface oﬀered to the developer. The
original interface is still available. The extensions take password(s) as extra
parameter(s) in the calls that handle protected targets (i.e., tuple space name
and tuples). The secure inter host communication is automatically turned on
by the usage of secure tuple spaces, therefore having no impact on the pro-
grammer interface. For encryption we use a variant of the 3DES private key
encryption algorithm that uses passwords instead of keys (the keys are gen-
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erated internally from the provided passwords). We consider this algorithm
secure enough for our purposes. The data being encrypted represents mes-
sages passed between hosts and not data that has to be stored safely. We also
assume that Java language’s protection mechanisms are robust enough not to
allow incorrect access to internal data of an object (e.g., a private member of
an object cannot be accessed by any other object). We do not address physical
level attacks like wireless signal jamming.
4.1 Password Protected Tuple Spaces
The name of the tuple space is the key to gaining access to the information
in that tuple space. To protect the information means to protect the name
of the tuple space. LimeSystemTupleSpace, among other information, con-
tains tuples that identify every tuple space (by name). Since the name is
available in LimeSystemTupleSpace, the ﬁrst step is to make the information
obtained from LimeSystemTupleSpace unusable in its raw form. Changes
are required to ensure that extracting the name of a protected tuple space
from LimeSystemTupleSpace will no longer provide enough information for
an agent to create a tuple space with the same name and share it with other
agents thus gaining unauthorized access to its information.
To achieve this, some processing of the tuple space name will be done on
the way from the constructor call, when creating the tuple space, to the in-
ternal storage of the name inside the system. The information available in
LimeSystemTupleSpace will be the processed name of the tuple space. We
make sure this information cannot be used in its form from LimeSystemTupleSpace
and also that it cannot be generated incorrectly.
For this reason tuple spaces are split in two categories: protected and
unprotected. If the user creates a tuple space that is intended to be secure,
the user will have to provide a password. If no password is provided, the tuple
space is assumed to be unprotected. For secure tuple spaces, the password is
used to encrypt the name before marking it as a secure tuple space name and
forwarding it to the previous implementation of Lime which will use it as if it
were a regular string representing a name of a tuple space that will be used
for sharing.
The interface the programmer uses to create secure tuple spaces is very
similar to the interface oﬀered by the previous version of Lime. The diﬀerence is
that tuple spaces (secure or not) are created using the SecureLimeTupleSpace
class. While the constructors still exist in their previous form, a new one was
created, with an extra parameter: the password (Figure 3). If no password is
provided, a simple, unprotected tuple space will be created, like in the previous
version of Lime.
The constructor call is the only place where the agent explicitly uses the
password. Once the agent has the handle to the tuple space, it does not
need the password anymore. The tuple space handle will enable the agent
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SecureLimeTupleSpace(java.lang.String name, java.lang.String password)
— creates a new secure tuple space using the public tuple space name and
the password. This call places an entry in a security table
mapping the encrypted name to the password.
Fig. 3. The call that creates a secure tuple space.
to access the tuple space for as long as the agent has it without having to
provide the password. All methods will be invoked as before and will use the
tuple space protection password transparently to the agent, if needed. A tuple
space operation can only be called by the Lime agent that created it. When
an operation is called on a tuple space, Lime veriﬁes that it was called by the
thread representing the agent that created it. Even if the handle of a tuple
space is obtained correctly by an agent, it cannot be transferred and used by
another agent. This is why it is not necessary to ask for the password when a
tuple space operation is called.
The name of the secure tuple space is obtained from the provided name and
password. This encrypted name appears in the LimeSystemTupleSpace. The
tuple space name (encrypted name when a password is provided or the plain
clear name if the tuple space is not meant to be protected) will be preﬁxed by
a diﬀerentiator: letter “U” for unencrypted or “S” for secure tuple space. The
tuple space called “blue” is diﬀerent from the tuple space called “blue” and
protected with password “pwd” (the latter will actually have the internal name
Kpwd(blue) ). They can coexist but no sharing takes place. The preﬁxes ensure
that a tuple space cannot be created incorrectly. Since they are internally
added, they cannot be manipulated by agents. Reading the name of a (secure)
tuple space from LimeSystemTupleSpace will not be enough to create an
insecure tuple space with the same name. A preﬁx will be attached in front of
whatever the programmer provides as a tuple space name. If an attacker reads
the name of a protected tuple space from LimeSystemTupleSpace and tries
to create a tuple space with the same name, there are two ways she/he could
follow. One is to create the tuple space as an unprotected tuple space. In this
case the system will add the “U” preﬁx and will not be shared with the original
tuple space. The second attempt would be to trick the system to add the “S”
preﬁx. To do so it will be necessary to create a secure tuple space. In this
case the information retrieved by the attacker from LimeSystemTupleSpace
is useless since she/he will need to provide the clear name and the correct
password. There are no “blank” passwords that can be used to encrypt a text
and to yield the same text as result. The preﬁxes also address the case when
the result of encrypting the clear name of a tuple space coincides with the
name of an unencrypted tuple space (before adding preﬁxes).
The encrypted name of a protected tuple space and the password that
protects it are important not only when the tuple space is created and shared
but also later in inter-host communication. This is why the Lime server has
a SecurityTable that stores entries of the form [encrypted name, password].
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An entry is added to this table every time a new secure tuple space is created.
When an operation is executed on the tuple space, if it runs on the local host
of the issuer (identiﬁable by location parameters that deﬁne the projection
of the tuple space) no further veriﬁcation is needed. For executions of tuple
space operations that span beyond the limits of issuer’s host, the table will be
used for more veriﬁcations. See Section 4.3 for details.
This SecurityTable is a very important target that has to be protected.
Currently, only the default Java object protection mechanisms protect this
table. We could encrypt it and provide a somewhat more diﬃcult access to
it but this would only shift the problem to protecting this password. Since
this paper does not address the Java security model, we assume this model is
secure enough for our research.
4.2 Tuple Level Protection.
To implement read-only tuples, several changes were needed to the previous
version of Lime and to Lights, the tuple space implementation that Lime uses.
Tuples are created in the same way as before. However, every tuple space
operation will add to the end of the user speciﬁed ﬁelds (if any) three ﬁelds.
They are in order: the read-password, the remove-password and the name of
the operation that uses that tuple or template (e.g., “rd” for any type of read
operation, “in” for any type of remove operation and “out” for any type of
write operation). This is because both tuples and templates are instances of
the Tuple class in Lime and the matching mechanism needs to diﬀerentiate
them, as well as the operation that requested the matching. If either pass-
word is absent the ﬁeld contains an instance of a NULL class (serializable
object replacing Java’s null). When a tuple is written to the tuple space, the
out method can specify both the read-password and the remove-password to
protect the tuple.
To read a tuple, we have provided a rdmethod which takes a read-password
beside the usual template. This method will construct a template that con-
tains the NULL in remove-password’s position and the read-password in the
right place. For removing a tuple, the situation is similar. The in operation
takes an extra parameter, the remove-password. The read-password is ﬁlled
in with the same value since we consider that a template that is allowed to
remove a tuple should also be allowed to read the tuple. In some cases one
of the two passwords expands in the other’s ﬁeld from a semantic point of
view. For example, if a tuple has a read password but no remove-password, a
template trying to remove the tuple will need to have the read-password. Like-
wise, if a tuple has a read-password and a remove-password, and the template
provides the remove-password for a read operation, access will be granted.
Group operations are implemented similarly. An outg protects each tuple
written to the tuple space with the password(s) provided (if any). The ing
and rdg operations return only the tuples that satisfy the matching criteria
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for both the data and security parts. Figure 4 shows examples of tuple space
access methods, involving passwords.
lts.out(ITuple tuple, char[] readPwd, char[] removePwd)
— writes a tuple to the tuple space and protects it against reading and/or
removing. Any combination of the two passwords is permitted.
lts.rd(ITuple template, char[] readPwd)
— reads a tuple from the tuple space if the tuple and the template match
(and the correct password is provided).
lts.in(ITuple template, char[] removePwd)
— removes a tuple from the tuple space if the tuple and the template match
(and the correct password is provided).
Fig. 4. The tuple space interaction operations.
Even though the matching of the ﬁelds is carried out internally by Lime,
the password ﬁelds in particular showed that it is useful to have the possibility
to chose the matching policy speciﬁc to a particular ﬁeld. This led us to add
to Lime the ability to select among three matching rules on a ﬁeld by ﬁeld
basis. First, a ﬁeld in a tuple may require the template to provide the exact
value of the ﬁeld for a match to be declared (hereafter called exact value
match). Second, the tuple may restrict only the type of the template ﬁeld to
be the exact type of it’s own ﬁeld. (hereafter called exact type). Finally, the
least constrained type of matching is when a tuple’s ﬁeld allows a wildcard
in the template’s corresponding ﬁeld. For example, the Java Object object is
a wildcard that will always match under these circumstances. This type of
matching takes advantage of Java’s OO polymorphism and this is why we’ll
call this policy poly type.
When ﬁelds are added to a tuple, the type of matching can be speci-
ﬁed for each of them. Figure 5 shows how ﬁelds are added to tuples and
how to specify the matching policy for each of them. Field.EXACT VALUE,
Field.EXACT TYPE and Field.POLY TYPE are predeﬁned integers in Field
class that identify the matching policies. The tuple passwords are transformed
into ﬁelds subject to the exact value policy and added at the end of the tuple
when written to the tuple space.
Tuple t = new Tuple();
t.addActual(new Integer(1), Field.EXACT VALUE)
.addActual(new String(”WU”));
— creates a tuple and adds ﬁelds it. To match this tuple, a template will need
to have an exact value on its ﬁrst ﬁeld (that is an actual of type Integer
and value 1). Since the second ﬁeld doesn’t have any matching policy speciﬁed,
the poly type is assumed.
Fig. 5. Adding ﬁelds and the matching policy to a tuple
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4.3 Communication Level Protection
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Fig. 6. Interceptors secure messages.
Operations on the federated tuple space cross host boundaries. These
entail host to host communication over insecure lines. When an agent executes
an operation that spans beyond the limits of the current host, an interceptor
catches it, analyzes the tuple space that the message refers to (the name of
the tuple space is always present in the message that travels across hosts) and
takes the appropriate action (the use of the interceptor pattern [15] is natural
for this case, when we add security to a system that in its initial design did
not address this issue). It also oﬀers a great deal of ﬂexibility with respect to
the choice of encryption protocol. Figure 6 shows how interceptors secure the
communication between two hosts.
The interceptor checks wether the tuple space name appearing in the out-
going message is present in the SecurityTable. If the message refers to an
unprotected tuple space (it is not in the table), the interceptor lets it pass
through unchanged. If the tuple space is a secure one, the interceptor will
extract from the table the password that corresponds to that tuple space and
will use it to encrypt the message. The interceptor creates a packet that con-
tains the encrypted message and the encrypted name of the tuple space the
message refers to and forwards this packet to the other involved host. On the
recipient’s side, actions happen symmetrically. Another interceptor catches
the incoming message, looks up the encrypted name of the tuple space in the
local SecurityTable and if found, uses the corresponding password to de-
crypt the message. The message is then forwarded to the LimeServer. If the
target tuple space is not a secure one, the name will not be found in the Secu-
rityTable and the message will be forwarded unchanged to the LimeServer.
The results are handled in the same way.
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Special attention has to be paid when using password-protected tuples in
unprotected tuple spaces. The traﬃc between two hosts is unprotected if it
refers to an unprotected tuple space. If such a tuple space contains a password
protected tuple (let’s say the tuple has only a read-password) then a rd or in
operation will need to provide the password along with the template. Let’s
assume a rd operation provides the correct password. Since the tuple space
is not protected, the communication is not encrypted so the password travels
in clear between the two hosts. A hacker could steal the password and use it
then to remove the tuple (the tuple does not have a remove password so the
read-password will be the only protection against removal as well). Password-
protected tuples are safe to use in unprotected tuple spaces as long as the
owner does not disclose the password (no message carrying a password should
travel over insecure communication channels).
5 Wireless Dashboard Application
The extensions presented in this paper were ﬁrst evaluated in a test application
that allows a car driving down a highway to make an electronic payment to
an approaching a tollbooth. As the car approaches the tollbooth, it discovers
the tollbooth, receives the list of prices, pays by credit card and continues its
journey without stopping. Figure 7 shows a screen capture of the tollbooth
application GUI.
Fig. 7. Automatic payment is a feature of the Wireless Dashboard application.
The implementation is as follows. The car has an agent specialized in
automatic payments (toll roads, parking, etc.). All these charge points are
conﬁgured to establish contact with vehicle agents in a predeﬁned, unprotected
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tuple space, called “payments.” The agent in the car also has a tuple space
called “payments.” When the car approaches the tollbooth, the two establish
contact and tuple spaces merge (they have the same name).
The agent in the car and the agent on the tollbooth will use the “payments”
tuple space to establish a secret session key (noted SSK ) for the purpose of
collecting the payment from the car in a secure manner. The tollbooth adver-
tises its public key (PK ) in a read-only tuple in the unprotected “payments”
tuple space (along with the list of prices for diﬀerent car sizes, types of credit
cards accepted, and other useful information) while keeping its pair (PK−1)
for itself (this will be used to decrypt incoming messages). The car reads the
public key and generates a tuple that contains its identiﬁer (license plate, or
VIN number) and a secret session key, both encrypted with the tollbooth’s
public key: < PK(name, SSK) >.
Since the authentication part of the protocol is assumed (i.e., the car knows
how to read a tuple from the tollbooth) the possible vulnerability is to read a
tuple containing PK, planted there by an attacker. To protect against this, the
car agent will have to verify that the tuple is read-only (i.e., by failing in the
attempt to remove it). The reader is reminded that, if the tuple is read-only,
it could not have been placed there by anybody else since protected tuples
cannot migrate. Another point of vulnerability is the public key encryption
algorithm. In our implementation we used Bouncy Castle’s implementation
of RSA public key encryption algorithm. Since cryptography is outside the
scope of this research, we also assume this encryption to be strong enough.
Using the name and SSK the car agent and the tollbooth agent will create
a secure communication channel, a protected tuple space, accessible only to
the two of them, where the payment will take place. After sharing the pro-
tected tuple space, the agent will send the credit card information to ﬁnish the
payment, based on the selection made by the driver from the options adver-
tised by the tollbooth. The transfer is done by having the tollbooth register a
reaction for the payment tuple that the car will write to the protected tuple
space. The tollbooth issues an electronic receipt in exchange. All sensitive
information is handled internally to each agent and, when sent across plat-
forms it travels encrypted. The tollbooth authenticates the car by accessing
a trusted server through the wired infrastructure.
6 Related Work
In an open environment such as a computer network and especially in the pres-
ence of mobile code roaming across hosts, security is an important issue. Other
projects also address this issue, trying to add diﬀerent levels of protection to
mobile agent systems and tuple space coordination of mobile agents. KLAIM
(A Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility) [10] addresses the
protection of data through the use of a capability based system combined with
a type hierarchy based system for access control. In Secure Spaces [16] the
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authors employ a ﬁne-grained approach to tuple matching mechanisms. They
go down to ﬁeld level to address security. They can protect each ﬁeld individ-
ually by locking it with a password. This is somehow similar to using exact
value matching for speciﬁc ﬁelds in the matching mechanisms described in this
paper. Agents can be stopped from learning about data stored as tuples by
requesting them to provide exact information in templates for tuple matching.
Several systems address the issue of protecting hosts from malicious agents.
The D’Agents system [6] uses public key cryptography to authenticate incom-
ing agents thus increasing the security of hosts. The more diﬃcult problem
of protecting the agent from curious hosts led to the approach of computing
with encrypted functions [13], [11]. The key idea here is that mobile agents
are able to decrypt code and data only if certain conditions are met by the
computing environment or at a speciﬁc moment.
In [14] it is shown that strong typing is an essential concept for achieving
strong security properties. The access rights are stored in a typed access rights
matrix inspired by the HRU model[7]. A capability based system adapted to
distributed computing is described in [5]. In Yalta [1] clients are logically
grouped in dynamic coalitions. Yalta relies on certiﬁcates and certiﬁcation
authorities for emission, revocation and validation of certiﬁcates which leads
to an architecture with several centralized hot points (certiﬁcation authority
and certiﬁcation revocation service). In [18] object attributes are used for co-
ordination, with applications in private communication channel establishment,
access control lists and global software distribution.
Distributed approaches to trust management are described in [12], [3],
and [8]. They approach security issues in distributed computing using a cen-
tralized trusted entity to provide credentials that delegate permissions. These
approaches are diﬃcult to implement in ad hoc networks because in such envi-
ronments it is almost impossible to maintain (or ensure access to) a centralized
point of access to authorize credentials.
Administrative domains [2], [17] restrict the execution environment by log-
ically dividing it into nested levels. The scope of a user’s operations can be
limited to his/her domain and the movement of running code can be restricted
to well determined areas.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a way to add security features to the Lime co-
ordination model. We chose Lime because it is the ﬁrst coordination model
designed for ad hoc networks. Our approach provides mechanisms needed to
control who can do what and how with which tuples. We have showed that
simple changes can transform a coordination model into a platform suitable
for the development of secure applications. The mechanisms are general and
can solve real issues in terms of secure coordination in ad hoc networks.
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